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A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL 
EVOLUTION, REVOLUTION, AND 
DEVOLUTION 
Laura Nader* 
COURTS -A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS. By Martin 
Shapiro. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. ix, 245. 
$20. 
LAWSUITS AND LITIGANTS IN CASTILE, 1500-1700. By Richard L. 
Kagan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1981. Pp. 
xvii, 274. $23. 
In Courts - A Comparative and Political Analysis, Professor Martin 
Shapiro develops a series of propositions about the different modes of deci-
sionmaking that characterize courts in various political systems. Shapiro's 
book appears in the same year with another contribution to legal history -
one concerned with the increased use of courts for purposes of dispute reso-
lution. In Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500-1700, Professor Richard 
Kagan describes changing litigation patterns and proposes to explain the 
increasing use of courts in Castile from 1450-1600 and the decline which 
followed. Both books are examples of a growing interest in the social con-
text of legal institutions and their use, and as such allow one to discern the 
major strengths and failings of the law and society movement as it has come 
to be known in the United States. My remarks in this review will revolve 
around three general themes: the uses and abuses of the comparative his-
torical method; ethnography and the use and presentation of data; and the 
theoretical and policy implications of this law and society research. 
I. POSING THE PROBLEM COMPARATIVELY 
In the Preface to his book Courts, Professor Shapiro tells us that his 
book has two purposes: one of which is pedagogic - a teaching tool for 
students interested in judicial process and comparative legal systems - and 
the other, to test a number of propositions about courts. From Professor 
Shapiro's point of view, comparative legal scholarship "has been a some-
what disappointing field" (p. vii), consisting of "showing that a certain pro-
cedural or substantive law of one country is similar to or different from that 
of another" (p. vii). "Or," he says, "alternatively, comparison consists of 
presenting descriptions of a number of legal systems side by side, . . . with 
no particular end in view" (p. vii). What Professor Shapiro proposes, how-
ever, is to use the comparative method as a substitute for the experimental 
• Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. A.B. 1952, Wells Col-
lege; Ph.D. 1961, Harvard University. - Ed. 
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method (which he says is "not a terribly satisfactory substitute but one 
pressed upon us by the impossibility of putting laws and nations in test 
tubes and bubble chambers" (p. vii)) to test his propositions about courts. 
As he states: 
My own position toward each of the propositions is then tested against the 
"worst case," that is, against that body of known legal phenomena most 
likely to falsify my position. The accumulated scholarship of comparative 
law is used as a catalogue for searching out these worst cases. The purpose 
is to move toward a more general theory of the nature of judicial institu-
tions. [P. vii.] 
Using secondary sources only, Professor Shapiro then sets out to test four 
propositions that he says define the conventional prototype of courts: inde-
pendence, adversariness, decision according to preexisting rules and win-
ner-take-all decisions. 
In each chapter Shapiro proceeds to carry out his purpose, taking care to 
look at the role of courts in relation to political organization. The challenge 
to the judicial independence theme of the conventional prototype of courts 
is placed in the context of English judicial experience because "the conven-
tional wisdom proclaims that it is in England that judicial independence 
has most clearly developed and flourished" (p. viii). The proposition that 
''judges decided by the application of preexisting legal rules" is examined in 
the context of the "civil law system in which judges are supposed to be 
strictly bound by codes" (p. vii). His assertion that "mediation and litiga-
tion invariably intermingle rather than maintain themselves as distinct al-
ternatives" (pp. viii-ix) is tested in the setting of the traditional Chinese 
legal system which he says "is often presented as having chosen the media-
tion and rejected the litigation alternative" (p. ix). And finally, he examines 
appeal in the context of traditional Islam, a legal system which he had ear-
lier described as lacking the means for appeal (p. ix). 
What Professor Shapiro finds as he examines the courts of England, 
Western Europe, imperial China, and Islam is hardly surprising, but worth 
briefly summarizing here. The English case teaches us that the "notion of 
judicial independence is so ambiguous and misleading that it cannot serve 
as a touchstone of 'courtness'" (p. 125). We learn that European courts do 
not "mechanically apply a set of complete, self-explanatory, preexisting le-
gal rules" (p. 154), and have achieved only a relative amount of judicial 
independence. The Chinese case illustrates that ''judicial systems almost 
invariably employ a mixture of mediation and winner-take-all decisions 
based on preexisting rules" (p. 191). In the case of Islam, the absence of 
appeal is related to the absence of hierarchical organization in Islam, for 
"without hierarchical organization much of both the opportunity and in-
centive for appeal is absent" (p. 221). The Islamic courts were insulated 
from central political authority and supplemented by the institutional com-
bination of dual legal systems. Shapiro concludes about midway with a 
principle that has been underlying most anthropological studies of law: 
"As a general principle it would appear wrong to seize upon the judicial 
institutions of any one nation, write them large, and then insist that the 
institutions of other nations are truly judicial only to the extent that they 
correspond to the model thus derived" (p. 125). 
Let me explain why I began by saying that his findings are not surpris-
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ing by returning to his earlier comments on the comparative method. Re-
call that when Shapiro criticizes the quality of work on comparative law, he 
is implicitly referring to studies by legal scholars that are not rigorously 
comparative or at least not comparative in any real sense. He also alludes 
to the scientific model and the use of the laboratory method of testing pro-
positions. What he does in Courts, however, is exactly in the tradition of 
the comparative law scholarship that he criticizes. He concludes that judi-
cial independence is not as independent as some have thought, that the Chi-
nese adjudicate as well as mediate, that the Europeans are not as rule 
conscious as someone said, etc. Indeed, his chapters are descriptions of le-
gal systems side by side. The comparative method as anthropologists 
(rather than legal scholars) have developed it needs to be controlled to have 
scientific validity. The method of controlled comparison that I refer to is 
the method of controlled variables. 1 
A major problem common to comparative studies lies in the formula-
tion of concepts or units which will permit comparative analysis without 
distortions. Just because Western scholars use the word "courts" to refer to 
a specified form of triadic assembly does not mean that everything labeled 
courts is functionally equivalent and comparable. A court is more than a 
third party; it is an institution. The question for the comparative method is, 
as Bohannan points out, "When are two things the same thing?"2 Who said 
that courts can be said to have a prototype characterized by the four fea-
tures mentioned by Shapiro? Controlled comparison is comparison with a 
standard, using controlled variables and not simply variables taken from a 
Western frame. Shapiro's prototype is ethnocentrically derived and leads to 
vague and unsubstantiated statements such as "We generally find ... high-
ly mediatory styles of judging in agrarian villages, with a strong tendency 
on the part of the villagers to avoid the more courtlike courts of the central 
regime" (p. 14). 
If Professor Shapiro's comparison is not controlled, then what is it? 
Based on the anthropological standards of comparison set by Eggan and 
Bohannan,3 I would argue it is casual comparison of the type Bohannan 
calls "selected counter-illuminative information," selecting data to illumi-
nate the case in hand. It is this approach that renders Professor Shapiro's 
work vulnerable to criticism. He states that conventional wisdom (no cita-
tions) argues that English courts are characterized by an independent judi-
ciary and then proceeds to select the instances from English legal history 
which negate conventional wisdom, whatever that is. In point of fact he 
could have selected his cases to prove the correctness of conventional wis-
dom. In the chapter on English law, he selected his materials from only one 
part of it, the English common law, when in fact various kinds of law pre-
1. For a valuable delineation of social anthropology and the method of controlled compar-
ison, see Eggan, Social Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Comparison, 56 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIST 743 (1954). See also Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal 
Anthropology, in LAW AND CULTURE IN SOCIETY 401 (L. Nader ed. 1969). For examples of 
controlled comparison, see Nader, Choices in Legal Procedure: Shiu Moslem and Mexican 
Zapotec, 61 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 394 (1965); Nader & Metzger, Conflict Resolution in 1wo 
Mexican Communities, 65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963). 
2. Bohannan, supra note l; p. 40. 
3. See Eggan, supra note l; Bohannan, supra note 1. 
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vailed, namely the ecclesiastical courts, the English borough courts, or the 
independent urban courts. 
The antiquated tone of Shapiro's book, which I associate with scholar-
ship at the tum-of-the century - a time when there was no adequate field 
data, which necessitated using whatever there was - is clearest in his treat-
ment of examples from non-Western village societies. In that context, his 
comparison may be considered both casual and false - casual in the sense 
that there is no control, and false in the sense that he is comparing data on 
living law in one culture with normative (selected normative) principles 
from another.4 The result of such a strategy is that Chapter I is punctuated 
with unreferenced statements and unsubstantiated generalizations of the 
sort that put off the anthropological reader and undermined the credibility 
of the whole endeavor. 
The following are selected examples of generalizations which may apply 
to a particular society but not to a group of societies called village or tribal: 
"In tribal societies organized under strong chiefs, the chiefs judge with or 
without the assistance of the elders and the body of tribesmen" (p. 20). "In 
village societies the elders do much of their own judging" (p. 20). "Simple 
societies rarely distinguish private from criminal law" (p. 24); "Most socie-
ties cannot afford or do not choose to allocate sufficient resources to provide 
three men or three institutions to do the job of governing what can be done 
by one . . . . Separate courts are a very expensive commodity" (p. 30). 
"Few human societies have found probabilistic treatment of evidence mor-
ally satisfying" (p. 46). Or, "In the context of conflict resolution, the major 
virtue of a trial is that it provides a definitive point of termination to the 
conflict" (p. 45), a statement which he does not document and for which 
there is a good deal of evidence to the contrary. Or, "It is doubtful, how-
ever, that very many societies experienced much pure popular judging" (p. 
56). Then, "In Chapter I we traced the substitutions of office and law for 
consent that characterizes at least a segment of most developed legal sys-
tems" (p. 65), coupled with the earlier statement, "Courts are clearly the 
least consensual and the most coercive of triadic conflict resolving institu-
tions" (p. 8).5 
Social scientists have made some progress in data collection since the 
nineteenth century. Anthropologists, in particular, have collected and ana-
lyzed ethnographic materials for dozens of societies that make the use of 
general and unspecified phrases such as "In most societies," or "in village 
societies," "in tribal societies," etc. inexcusable in 1981. It is not, for in-
stance, true that there is a universal tendency of persons in a dispute to seek 
out the assistance of a third party.6 Again, selecting from the harvest of 
4. See Van Velsen, Procedural /'!formality, Reconciliation, and False Comparison, in IDEAS 
AND PROCEDURES IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (M. Gluckman ed. 1968). 
5. Many of these quotes ignore the diversity in societies. Medical specialists, who need not 
be elders, may play a judge-like role because of their special form of knowledge. And what is 
a ''village society," anyway? The diversity in social structure and culture is immense. As for 
simple societies rarely distinguishing private from criminal law, see Nader & Parnell, Criminal 
Law and its E'!forcement in Preliterate Societies, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
(S. Kadish ed. forthcoming). 
6. See A. BEST & A. ANDREASON, TALKING BACK TO BUSINESS: VOICED AND UNVOICl!D 
CONSUMER COMPLAINTS (1976); L. NADER, No ACCESS TO LAW (1980). A major finding of 
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decades of anthropological research in such an unsystematic manner serves 
to build arguments, not science. Shapiro says that Courts is an inquiry into 
the conventional understanding of judicial institutions. What is this con-
ventional wisdom that Shapiro speaks about, and to whom do such conven-
tions belong? We are never told. The style of this study is unbecoming to a 
serious political theorist. 
A closer examination of Shapiro's contributions leave me puzzled as to 
what he thinks he is demonstrating. It is no surprise to a practitioner or an 
anthropologist that what may be considered standard for American courts 
does not fit all courts,7 nor is it surprising that courts perform shadow work 
above and beyond applying preexisting norms governing adversary pro-
ceedings. 8 It has been known for years that while the state may be associ-
ated with courts, courts are not always associated with the state. Nor is it 
new that courts devise new rules (make law) rather than simply applying 
preexisting rules.9 It is also not surprising to discover that courts mix medi-
ation with adversary procedures, thereby producing compromise rather 
than winner-take-all decisions. 10 Since a whole generation of social scien-
tists have dealt with issues relating to the political process, Professor Sha-
piro's findings have revealed nothing that is new in this field of research. I I 
Professor Shapiro's contribution may be in challenging the ideas of aca-
demics who may still hold onto ethnocentric notions that limit the growth 
of theory in the area of politics and the judicial system. But if Shapiro's 
intent was to infuse ethnocentric notions with counter-illumination from 
cross-cultural and transnational studies, he, himself, needs to be more con-
vinced of the "prototypedness" of his own thinking. Then at least he could 
make explicit the structures of vertical and horizontal pluralism that have 
led us to realize early on that more than one legal system is operating 
within the borders of the state at any one time and that a society is not an 
undifferentiated whole. Pluralism may be caused by ethnic variation or by 
class variation (or stratification), or by structural differences. If Shapiro 
had applied the notion of multiplicity expounded by a number of nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century scholarsI2 - the notion that several 
legal systems may exist within a given society - the straw man in his chap-
ter on China would have been analyzed as just that. Anthropologist Leo-
pold Pospisil has written extensively on legal multiplicity. He states: 
both of these works is that Americans seek out the assistance of a third party in rare cases. The 
predominant pattern is the dyad-negotiation. 
1. See, e.g., Nader, Styles in Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY 69 (L. Nader ed. 1969). 
8. See L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL CASE DIS-
POSITION (1979). 
9. See K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); I. SCHAPERA, TRIAL 
LEGISLATION AMONG THE TSWANA OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE (1943); I. 
SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (1938). 
10. See, e.g., Nader, supra note 7. 
11. See, e.g., I. SCHAPERA, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TRIBAL SOCIETIES (1956); I. 
SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (1938); G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITA-
TIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959). 
12. See Nader & Nader, A Wide Angle on Regulation, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES (R. Noll ed. 198 forthcoming). 
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Traditionally, law has been conceived as the property of a society as a 
whole. As a logical consequence, a given society was thought to have only 
one legal system that controlled the behavior of all its members. Without 
any investigation of the social controls that operate on the subsociety 
levels, subgroups (such as associations and residential and kinship groups) 
have been a priori excluded from the possibility of regulating their mem-
bers' behavior by systems of rules applied in specific decisions by leaders of 
these groups - systems that in their essential characteristics very closely 
parallel the all-embracing law of the society. This attitude was undoubt-
edly caused by the tremendous influence the well-elaborated and unified 
law of the Roman Empire exerted upon the outlook of the European law-
yer. Had classical Greece exercised such influence over the legal minds of 
our civilization, our traditional concept oflaw might have been much more 
flexible and, cross-culturally speaking, "realistic." 13 
If we utilize the idea of multiplicity of legal systems, there is evidence for 
arguing that in imperial China, state law protects state interests, that cus-
tomary law protects the interests· of the landowners, and that mediation 
(which Shapiro never does locate in Chinese society) is reserved for dealing 
with disagreements between status equals at all levels of that society.14 
But Shapiro is thinking ethnocentrically, from the point of view of Eu-
ropean legal categories, and so fails to recognize mediation as one of several 
distinct legal structures in Chinese society. Instead, he concludes that the 
system is a "mixture" of mediation and adjudication. Likewise, the ques-
tion he addresses about appeal in Islamic law arises from thinking in terms 
of a hierarchy of courts, on the Western European model. But Islamic law 
is not concerned with procedure, but with fitting the facts to the proper legal 
principles. In discussing appeal comparatively, the functional equivalent of 
the Western notion of appeal should be set in the context of a multiple 
number of remedy agents, only one of which may be the Islamic Court 
where appeal, as we know it, is horizontal, not hierarchical. 
It is true that the notion that law is monopolized by the state has had a 
strong impact on scholarly thinking about the relation of state law to the 
societal elements within the state. However, the idea of the multiplicity of 
legal systems has, significantly, been accepted by researchers working in 
countries where legal pluralism is a fact of life because of colonialism of 
one sort or another. 15 
The concept of multiplicity has also been applied by those trying to un-
derstand the legal center of power. As Pospisil has said, the dogma regard-
ing the law of the state as the most powerful source of social control proves 
to be a myth in some instances in our Western civilization: 
In the long perspective the center of power, of course, is not a static phe-
nomenon. The relative amount of power at the various levels within a 
society . . . may diminish or increase, with the result that the center of 
power ( defined by the relative amount of control power of the various soci-
13. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 99 ()971). 
14. In Nader & Shugart, Old Solutions far Old Problems, in No ACCESS TO LAW 57, 75-86 
(1980), we observed that when mediation or arbitration was used for settling disputes between 
people of unequal power, the person of lesser power usually loses. Our recommendation was 
that mediation be reserved for dealing with disagreements between status equals. 
15. See generally THE IMPOSITION OF LAW (A. Burman & B. Harrell-Bond eds. 1979), 
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etal segments) may shift its position to another level. 16 
In 1942, Roscoe Pound elaborated upon the thesis that the state's role in 
social control increases as traditional social control, e.g. , kinship and reli-
gion, breaks down, 17 and others before and since have analyzed the interre-
lations between law and social organization.18 What this idea encourages, 
then, is an interactive model which stems from an understanding of histori-
cal development and from the recognition that courts expand and contract 
often in direct consequence of the political intentions of the state and its 
citizens. I will deal with this particular topic in my discussion of Kagan's 
Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile. 
I do not find any new understanding in Courts, yet when I forget Sha-
piro's stated purposes, I come away thinking that the work is significant as a 
catalyst, especially for those who have spent a long time immersed in com-
parative materials. Counter-illumination strategy has a function, although 
different from controlled comparison. The profiles of English, Continental 
European, Chinese, and Islamic law that he presents are valuable as brief 
summaries of the materials on adjudication in four grand legal systems of 
our world, and the book should encourage a new generation of comparative 
historical legal research - one that would move us beyond the contribu-
tions of Ehrlich and Pound. 19 
II. THE ETHNOGRAPHIC-HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
Professor Kagan's work Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile presents an in-
teresting contrast to Courts; it is a contextual analysis of litigation in one 
society over approximately three hundred years. Kagan uses primary 
sources in order to examine Castilian litigation between 1500 and 1700. He 
explores the beginnings in this southwestern comer of Europe of what 
might be described as a period of "legal revolution," an age in which the 
formal adjudication of disputes was sharply and dramatically on the rise (p. 
xx). His book is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with "the eco-
nomic, social, legal and political changes in Castile that . . . precipitated a 
sharp increase in the overall volume of civil litigation, accompanied by a 
widespread interest in legal study, the development of a sophisticated legal 
profession, and the expansion of the royal judiciary" (p. xxii). Part II is his 
attempt to explain "why . . . Castile's 'legal revolution' ran out of steam, 
leading to an apparent decline in litigation, retrenchment in the law facul-
ties, and stagnation of courts and tribunals that had flourished in an earlier, 
more litigious age" (p. xxii). His view of legal history illustrates a sophisti-
cated understanding of the multiplicity oflegal systems: "I approach litiga-
tion not from a legal perspective but from a social and political one, 
viewing it principally as one of several methods by which disputes and con-
flicts are eventually resolved" (p. xviii). Kagan describes his view of legal 
history as approximating that of Jerold S. Auerbach (and, incidentally, . 
16. L. POSPISIL, supra note 13, at 118. 
17. R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942). 
18. See, e.g., MAX WEBER ON LAW IN EcoNOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). 
19. See E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936). 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:993 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim)20 who observed that "legal history is a chap-
ter of social history, not a self-contained entity."21 
In Kagan's book we are again dealing with conventional wisdom. This 
time, in relation to litigation rates; the West is said to be more litigious than 
the East. China and Japan, we are told, are models of low levels of litig-
iousness, with relatively few lawyers. We have in Kagan's introduction a 
live example of the conventional wisdom to which Professor Shapiro was 
referring. Kagan tells us early on: "Nor did Eastern potentates develop 
complex institutions specializing in the administration of justice; instead, 
rulers relied principally upon military and other nonlegal institutions to en-
force their power. Consequently, adjudication was never given an opportu-
nity to become a routine method of resolving disputes" (p. xxiii). Having 
posed the comparison - which Professor Shapiro might well say is a "false 
comparison," in the sense that what he says about the East is true at one 
level but not at another level - Kagan has his problem: he has profiled the 
West as peculiarly litigious and dependent on lawsuits, the East as not, and 
he can now proceed to explain the difference. Litigiousness, he tells us, was 
"a function of a worldview that placed greater emphasis on individual 
rights than on individual responsibilities" (p. xix). The development of the 
market economies of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries expanded the de-
mand for dispute resolution by creating new reasons for lawsuits. The cen-
tralized monarchies used the rule oflaw, implemented and defended by the 
central government, to sabotage the power of local authorities, particularly 
the landed aristocracy. Adjudication, according to Kagan was "a seryice 
provided to promote loyalty" (p. xix), and in the process became an integral 
strategy of the rulers' efforts to expand their authority. The result of this 
combination of economic expansion, increase in population, state-building, 
and law, was a Castilian society immersed in litigation. Conversely, in sev-
enteenth-century Castile, economic and demographic decline resulted in di-
minished litigation and decentralized social control mechanisms, a situation 
where "the extreme litigiousness of the sixteenth century was a thing of !he 
past as such other modes of dispute settlement as out-of-court arbitratibn 
with the help of lawyers came to the fore" (p. xxii). 
This book, based on extensive research in Spanish archives, is a major 
contribution to our understanding of the evolution of litigation in Castile 
over three hundred years. The topic of litigation in Spain has barely been 
examined and, as Kagan tells us, is not a popular subject among historians 
despite the fact that litigation has been of political importance in our 
time.22 As promised, Kagan's study explores the routine, daily processes of 
litigation in the context of the needs, the stress, and the politics of economic 
life. We learn who uses the courts and for what reasons. Peasants, trades-
20. See E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893); K. MARX, CAPITAL: 
A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ()967); MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOC!· 
ETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). 
21. P. xviii (quoting J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICAN 77 (1977)). 
22. Indeed, it has become commonplace in U.S. society for members of the bench (with the 
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in the forefront) and the Bar to complain about the 
increase in litigation. The basis for their remarks is rarely made clear - increase according to 
population, need, length of case, demand, or what? 
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men (such as tanners, dyers and innkeepers), widows seeking to protect 
their dowries from husbands' creditors, as well as nobles, brought cases 
dealing with problems of inheritance, property, commercial transactions, 
debt collection, honor, libel and slander. We learn of the emergence of 
legal practitioners, the lawyers and advocates, and judges, all of whom had 
a personal interest in the "law business," and of their emerging legal 
culture. 
The description is rich with the complex motivations of human beings 
caught up in a world of political and economic competition. For Kagan, 
the bargaining, the corruption, the advocacy, are part and parcel of a com-
petition for power between landowners and peasants, lawyers and clients, 
between the judges who ran Castile's highest level courts and the Hapsburg 
rulers. To begin with, the legal practitioners used the legal system as a 
means for competing for royal favor. In later years, however, they 
sabotaged royal justice, forcing clients of this system to fend for themselves 
in the local judicial marketplace. The popular image of law and lawyers 
during much of this period was one of "corrupt greedy practitioners, inter-
ested only in money" (pp. 59-60), and "many pined for some idealized vi-
sion of justice that was ~wift, easy, and cheap. The same utopian vision of 
justice lies at the heart of criticism about lawyers being too expensive, 
courts too corrupt, and litigation too slow" (p. 77). 
In spite of the criticism, Kagan informs us that there were some plusses, 
for the traditional small face-to-face arbitration procedures were unsuited 
to a growing economy. A lawsuit in one of the king's courts furnished peo-
ple who did not know one another - merchants living in widely separated 
parts of the kingdom or even in other countries, widows lacking powerful 
supporters, individuals without strong family ties - with the means by 
which to settle their disputes. In other words, demographic growth, geo-
graphic mobility, primary group fragmentation, and growing disparities be-
tween the rich and poor were accompanied by an increase in the number 
and types of disputes which could not be adequately resolved by the infor-
mal mechanisms of conciliation and compromise. Litigation in one of the 
king's courts increasingly became an effective alternative for protecting 
one's interests. In short, Kagan states: "I am suggesting . . . that the 
changes set into motion by economic expansion and population growth 
were the fundamental cause of much of the increase in litigation recorded 
in Castile's courts . . . . Peasants in England and France experienced simi-
lar tensions ... and in these countries the evidence also suggests that litiga-
tion in the sixteenth century was on the rise" (p. 136). An interesting 
hypothesis. 
Like Professor Shapiro's book, Kagan's work is catalytic in its effect on 
the reader. But unlike Shapiro, Kagan tests his hypothesis with controlled 
variables and the result is more congenial to disproof and disciplined argu-
ment. My admiration for Kagan's work, for the care he takes in describing 
the different types of courts and legal procedures in Castile over a three-
hundred-year period does not, however, hinder me from taking issue with 
his central concept: litigiousness. Litigiousness, Kagan tells us, is "know-
ing how to exploit courts and legal procedures for one's own advantage" (p. 
89). He also comments that "[t]he accepted definition of a litigious person 
is one who litigates frequently" (p. 89). The Webster's Dictionary defini-
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tions also associate the words "litigate", "litigation", and "litigious" with 
"to make the subject of a lawsuit, to contest in law, to carry on a legal 
contest by judicial process," but Webster's also links "litigious" with the 
words, "contentious, belligerent, dispute, quarrel."23 In the broadest sense, 
Kagan is concerned with patterns of court use, and he would have to admit 
that a society that had no court could still be litigious. The Chinese could 
be as litigious (in the sense of contentious) as· members of another society, 
and yet not use courts. In other words, we should separate questions about 
levels of litigiousness from patterns of court use. In fact, all that Kagan can 
tell us from the records is something about the level of court use, and not 
about levels of litigiousness in Castile or more generally, in the West. As it 
is, Kagan speaks in terms of conventional wisdom when he refers to the 
"litigious spirit of Western society" (p. 126), associating the rise of the litig-
ious spirit with the republics and city-states of northern Italy in the late 
Middle Ages, specifically, "the spread of Roman law and the rise of a large 
and sophisticated legal class" (p. 126). This may be so, but the next step 
after separating the general term "litigiousness" from "court use," or recog-
nizing court use as but one form of litigiousness, is to compare court use 
patterns. In the United States, it has been observed that patterns of court 
use may vary from state to state and county to county and within a county 
during the same historical period.24 Furthermore, in my own research, I 
have compared two agricultural societies, the Jale of New Guinea where 
there are no courts, to the Zapotec, where there are courts, and I would 
conclude that the Jale are more litigious than the Zapotec, despite the latter 
group's very high percentage of court use (an average of 50-60 cases per 
month, involving over 250 persons in a population of 2,000).25 
This brings me to my second observation on litigiousness as a useful 
concept. The concept may be treated quantitatively or qualitatively - both 
of which Kagan has done. He tells us that for all their apparent litigious-
ness, Castilians thought that litigation was bad and they viewed the law 
with suspicion, distaste and disapproval, some likening it to a disease. In-
deed, lawsuits were considered sinful, a symbol of discord. He explains that 
"[l]itigiousness . . . was a function of a world view that placed greater em-
phasis on individual rights than on individual responsibilities" {p. xix). In 
fact, one could argue that litigiousness was a function of a world view that 
placed greater emphasis on individual rights than on social responsibility, 
for Kagan also reports that Castile was a " 'composite society,' an amalgam 
of hundreds of small corporate groups and communities held together only 
loosely by common economic circumstances, legal privileges, and shared 
allegiances to the church and the Spanish crown" (p. 18). 
By the time I finished this book, I had the sense that both the author and 
the Castilian observers he quotes thought that litigation was undesirable, 
and that probable observers, whether academics or administrators, more 
23. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 491-92 (6th ed. 1961). 
24. See, e.g., Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San 
Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Socv. REV. 267 (1976). 
25. Koch, "Pigs and Politics in the New Guinea Highlands: Conflict Escalation Among the 
Joie," in THE DISPUTING PROCESS 41 (L. Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978); L. Nader, Law in 
Conlexl: The Structure and Ideology of Control, Tressoline Lecture, Lehigh University 1981. 
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generally think that litigation is bad. There are, however, other views -
one from the claimant for whom litigation is an expression of a desire for 
justice, a means of testing one's rights rather than simply an expression of 
squabbling and quarreling. Supporters of the victims' bill of rights move-
ment in California recently tried to communicate their concern about the 
justice motive in their attempt to reconstruct the position of the victim in 
American legal relations.26 For the claimant who feels aggrieved and 
wronged, litigation is an expression of belief in justice and moral behav-
ior.27 It is not simply the result of competition, power grabbing, or power 
consolidation. 
The most interesting aspect of Kagan's description of court users is the 
universal use pattern. The king and aristocracy were primary court users, 
but peasants, tradesmen and even widows also entered this arena. The le-
gal institutions of the rulers were democratized in relation to access, one 
might say, in order to attract loyalty and followers to the rulers, but they 
democratized in order to attract citizens. The explanation for decline of liti-
gation or court use then is not only demographic and economic "decline," 
but also the withdrawal of access to universalistic procedures - or at least, 
the evolution of a court system that began to cost too much, in a context 
distressingly similar to the United States in the 1980s. 
The last part of Lawsuits and Litigants is an analysis of devolution in 
Castile. There is no doubt that the royal judiciary deteriorated in the sev-
enteenth century, but Kagan places this phenomenon in a broader frame-
work: "[T]he decay of royal justice was but a small part of a wider 
redistribution of economic and political power that affected all of Castile in 
the seventeenth century" (pp. 234-35). The movement of political power 
was from the center to the periphery. While it is true that the machinery of 
royal justice was not meeting the demand for legal services, its decline indi-
cated a redistribution of power from the center to the regions, from the 
crown to the aristocracy and officeholding families in charge of the major 
urban areas. Kagan has presented a dynamic picture of the role of law over 
three centuries, combining both the top-down and the bottom-up perspec-
tive, the user model with the state and private power models oflegal devel-
opment. The result is a sophisticated use of much of the best research 
methodology available in the social sciences. He has presented us with a 
relatively controlled comparison that will be an invaluable resource. His 
explanations, however, are specific to this one case rather than relating to a 
body of theory on social stratification in the classic traditions of a Marx or a 
Weber. It will be up to others to build on his case and to test his more 
general assumptions about litigation and Western litigiousness. 
Ill. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
By now, the theoretical implications of this review should be plain. If 
Professor Shapiro takes the view that he is doing science (f.e., using a model 
26. See Mandel, Crime Victim, Legal Victim, Turns Crusader, San Francisco Chronicle, 
Jan. 16, 1983, for a description of the motives behind the desired reconstruction of the status 
and rank of victim. 
27. See Lerner, The Justice Motive in Social Behaviour in ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCAR-
CITY AND CHANGE (M. Lerner & s. Lerner eds. 1981). 
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comparable to the laboratory method), he is not. His propositions are too 
broad to be tested, his data based on secondary sources which are too selec-
tive, the ethnocentricity of the prototype of courtness too arbitrary. The 
book is a good one to read if the reader has had considerable experience 
with cross-cultural materials on law, but it has not made a contribution to 
legal theory. This work, unfortunately, reflects the tradition of the lawyer 
for whom evidence is information that may be useful in winning a case. 
For the scientist, however, evidence is used to test a hypothesis or connec-
tion between collected facts; science is empirical rather than argumentative. 
Unfortunately, the method of testing propositions against the "worst case," 
that is, against the body of data most likely to falsify the proposition, is not 
an adequate tool if used too broadly, and not in the best social science 
tradition. 
Professor Kagan, on the other hand, describes himself as doing histori-
cal work that I would view as basically scientific in approach. He is using 
ethnographic evidence ( contextual data) to test a hypothesis and to illus-
trate the connection between collected facts. He presents us with some pro-
positions which should predict legal variation in the mobilization or 
initiation of cases. Indeed, the book is an illustration of Pound's thesis 
(mentioned earlier) that the state's role in social control expands and con-
tracts in relation to the growing or diminishing role of traditional social 
control. As Donald Black puts it, law increases as other social control de-
creases.28 Furthermore, this study fits into that body of social theory that 
states that with everything else held constant, disputes between people of 
different classes are more likely to result in legal action than disputes be-
tween equals. Durkheim's work on legal evolution (1893) and Stevenson's 
on population and statehood in Africa (1968) support Kagan's hypothesis 
that law increases with increased population density.29 The ethnographic 
data on American Indians illustrate the waxing and waning of law in 
rhythm with corresponding changes in social organization.30 
There are some parallels in these two different works. The authors of 
both books under review have failed to give us a concluding chapter - one 
chapter that either links their work to a wider body oflegal or social theory, 
or helps us to assess the implications of their work for the contemporary 
period. Both authors are products of their time. The past twenty years in 
the United States have highlighted issues in these books that are at the heart 
of legal policy in this country. It is in relation to legal policy that I think 
Shapiro's book makes its most important contribution. Throughout the 
work, but particularly in the first chapter, Shapiro raises the questions of 
law and the legitimacy of law in relation to the state. The judicial process 
lends legitimacy to the political process. In this sense, the work of the 
courts is the centerpiece of the state apparatus,31 and one that depends on 
28. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOUR OF LAW 6-7, 107-11 (1976). 
29. See E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 289-90 (G. Simpson trans. 
1933); R. STEVENSON, POPULATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TROPICAL AFRICA (1968). 
30. See, e.g., J. RICHARDSON, LAW AND STATUS AMONG THE KIOWA INDIANS, (1940); 
Lowie, Some Aspects of Political Organization among the American Aborigines, 18 J. ROYAL 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 11 (1948). 
31. See M. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 180-95 (H. Gerth & C. 
Mills eds. 1946). 
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mutual consent of the users of the courts as conflict resolvers. But courts 
are also social controllers and what Shapiro calls their social logic is under-
cut if they are embedded in the political machinery of their regime. 
Kagan's contribution to legal policy is of another sort. His work on 
Castilian litigation serves to reinforce an American stereotype of courts and 
litigation as.necessary evils rather than as institutions responding to the jus- · 
tice motive. A depiction of courts filled with greedy practitioners and liti-
gants may strengthen the currently held view of some American justices, a 
view based more on feeling than fact, that Americans litigate too much and 
that they should be encouraged to stop litigating or, at least, to take their 
cases to extra-judicial forums. We might do well to note that high court 
litigation rates in Castile corresponded with a very prosperous, energetic 
and creative period of Spanish history. 
Both books demonstrate that our theories and policies could be enor-
mously enriched by scholarship that is both comparative and hist~rical. 
Scholars using the comparative and historical approach, however, must 
guard against assessing the legal expression of other cultures on the basis of 
the political biases and concerns of our own society. Legitimacy, control, 
liberal ideology and system breakdown are fundamental questions of our 
times. The comparative/historical model can improve our theoretical in-
sights on law only to the degree that we can step outside our own system 
and examine others in terms of their own history, social structure, and 
culture. 
